Christmas Day, 1989: Romania. When the smoke cleared from the twin gunshots that ended Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu’s lives foreigners were given free rein in the country after the better part of four decades. Journalists were some of the first to arrive. What they found was a tentative hope from the people. When they entered the orphanages, hidden for decades by the regime all they found were eerily silent children packed almost 15 to a room, skeletal infants, antisocial infants that had not learned how to smile far past the typical time it took to learn how, and children with special needs chained to their beds and lying in their own excrement while they wasted away due to an autoimmune disease, a lack of care, a lack of touch, or a mixture of all three.

The East European Communist regimes were obsessed with economic growth. Most often this growth was pursued with a strategy of consistently adding inputs such as raw materials and labor.^[1] However, the leaders of these countries often had to contend with setbacks such as declining birth rates.^[2] These countries had several approaches to encourage women to have more children, such as putting mild restrictions on abortion or enacting economic policies that rewarded women who gave birth. Despite the variety of strategies to stimulate the birth rate, one country in particular enacted a series of draconian policies that would have a devasting effect on its population and the children who were born as a result. Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu decided in 1966 to criminalize abortions which up until that point had been readily available and widely used to regulate fertility. The ban, enacted to produce more workers who would grow the economy led to over a hundred-thousand forgotten and largely mistreated children being abandoned in state run orphanages by the time the Communist regime fell in 1989.

The how of the children’s circumstances is much clearer than the why. Why so many children ended up in orphanages and why Romania pursued such draconian pronatalist policies compared to other communist countries will be answered. From the beginning of his rule in Romania, Ceausescu presented himself as the protector of Romanian sovereignty from all foreign powers, especially the Soviet Union. This need to protect Romanian independence by increasing population and in turn growing the economy was why Ceausescu went down such a drastic route of policy decisions when better alternatives had already been implemented by his neighbors. Due to his sultanistic cult of personality and his consolidation of his own power in the party and government he felt that he had the political, cultural, and social clout to disregard the suffering and unrest he caused for his people, believing that he had enough power to keep them contained. Ultimately, Ceausescu believed in his own cult. However, Ceausescu’s views could not all be just politically based. The coercive pronatalist laws Romania enacted were also affected by gender. While all the East European countries were highly patriarchal Romania had a long history of the biopoliticization of women’s bodies which emerged in the interwar period.^[3] In the end, Ceausescu’s decisions were largely not morally based, but instead he made his decisions on how much control it would help him attain, so he could rule over Romania with no interference from the outside world. As Zuzanna Brzozowska stated, “The governments were afraid of labour shortage; they also believed in a direct link between national power and population size, and so procreation was proclaimed as the duty of every loyal citizen.”^[4] His own party, government, military, and citizens he felt he had adequately discouraged from descent and revolution. He would prove to be right for almost 3 decades.

The Warden of National Independence

Cults of personality did not begin with Ceausescu. His predecessor Gheorghiu-Dej established a cult of personality, but during Ceausescu’s regime the rhetoric grew to an “absurd level.”^[5] When Ceausescu first came into power the emphasis was on collective leadership, so no individual would hold all state and party power, but this would soon change.^[6] Ceausescu passed laws that made it so he held all party and state power and began replacing officials with his own supporters.^[7] After the end of collective leadership, Ceausescu cemented his authority by bureaucratic tinkering that included elite rotation which was the principle that had elites reassigned to new positions in the state and party and even between the national and county level so nobody could ever consolidate power except for Ceausescu himself.^[8] Many family members were given governmental positions: Elena Ceausescu, her brothers, and their son Nicu were given positions to cement loyalty to Ceausescu.^[9] By the time the regime collapsed in 1989, some theorized that fifty or more relatives held influential positions in Ceausescu’s regime.^[10]

While Ceausescu had succeeded in building a solid foundation for a period of time, he still had to actually build his cult of personality from the ground up. Romanian nationalism would be a large part of the foundation for his cult and the perfect opportunity to get a running start on his plans would come with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.^[11] When the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia Ceausescu immediately condemned the decision and signaled nationalism as the foundation of his cult as he identified “the Romanian way of building socialism” instead of the Soviet model.^[12] This affair allowed Ceausescu to become a “national hero overnight, adored for his promise that no power would be allowed to ‘violate the territory of our homeland,’” and pose as the lone man who dared to stand up against the Soviet Union for Romanian interests.^[13] This nationalistic foundation and his, “supreme authority over every topic” allowed Ceausescu to pursue decisions, economic, demographic, or otherwise, unimpeded by critics and with the justification that his actions kept any foreign power from being able to, “’violate the territory of our homeland.’”^[14] Romanian independence was a promise he made after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and one he was willing to let his own people die for.

Economic Factors to Consider

Romania’s economy followed the Soviet Union’s centrally planned format. This meant that the country directly controlled almost every single aspect of the economy which included setting prices for goods and services. Soviet style economies, like Romania and the other East European countries pursued an “extensive strategy” of economic development. ^[15] This strategy sought to create economic growth by adding inputs, such as raw materials and particularly labor.^[16] The labor aspect of this strategy is critical to understanding the forces that led to the banning of abortion in Romania. However, by the 1960s almost all eligible people were employed. Without more labor, countries such as Romania would have to pursue an “intensive strategy of development,”^[17] which would eventually lead to adopting world market mechanisms. This approach would be unacceptable to Ceausescu.

In 1966 Ceausescu divulged his concerns about the declining birthrate at a medical conference where he recommended measures be taken to defend the “integrity of the family.”^[18] Then on January 1, 1986, he declared “more children must be born…to ensure the future of the nation and its youthful vigor,” when he announced further restrictions regarding family matters.^[19] During a propaganda campaign that same year, a Romanian newspaper stated that raising the birthrate was “a cause of today and a cause of tomorrow for the whole country…A house with many children is proof of a good citizen’s concern for the nation’s future.” ^[20] In this public statement, ordered and controlled by Ceausescu, the typically private matter is connected with the nation’s future and thus becomes a public matter for the state to control in order to achieve its own goals. As you can see from the previous two statements about the necessity to raise the birthrate, the future of the nation is hinged on the success of its pronatalist policies. Obviously then, the low birthrate was a heavy burden on Ceausescu’s mind. Radio Bucharest in that same period argued that a high birthrate was “an absolutely indispensable condition for continued economic development.”^[21] The matter of women having more children was an ongoing issue for the regime from the 1960s until its collapse which is demonstrated through Ceausescu’s increasing efforts through the decades to raise the birthrate through increasingly invasive laws and propaganda campaigns.

What future was raising the birthrate supposed to ensure and how would it do so? Procreation became “the national duty, patriotic task, and moral obligation of all able citizens,” and to go against this obligation was to actively betray the nation.^[22] This sentiment could be connected to how women’s bodies had been biopoliticized in Romanian society with their bodies being inherently linked to their identities. To not give birth would “run counter to their normal sexual functions and the well-being of humanity.”^[23] Once again, it is vital to remember that population size was directly related to the power of the nation.^[24] A high population and birthrate was also related to continued economic development by Radio Bucharest. Clearly, Ceausescu believed that economic growth would also build his power and protect Romanian independence from the Soviet Union and eventually Western Powers. He would pursue this “go-it-alone” strategy even more heavily in the 1980s after taking on a 10.2 billion debt after borrowing heavily from Western powers.^[25]

“A cornerstone of the Ceausescu Doctrine was self-sufficiency.”^[26] This is the key to understanding the enigma that was Ceausescu’s decision making. Ceausescu’s goal was an autarkic economic system in Romania. Autarkic as in an economy that was entirely self-sufficient. This meant that eventually Ceausescu would no longer need to rely on the world market, borrowing from foreign powers such as the West, and would not need to rely on the Soviet Union which was Ceausescu’s biggest foe in his eyes. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he realized the necessity to become completely independent from the Soviet Union, so if Romania was invaded, he would be able to fight back and maintain his control over the country.

East European Pronatalist Policies

In order to comprehend how utterly drastic Romania’s pronatalist policies were, one must be made aware of the policies of neighboring Communist countries and how their regimes handled the declining birthrate. Almost all of the East European countries had dealt with a declining birthrate since their inception and with centrally planned economies this spelled disaster. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the crude birthrates had fallen to very low levels by the mid-1960s.^[27] The rate of natural increase per 1,000 people in Romania was 6.0, Czechoslovakia was 6.4, and 2.4 in Hungary.^[28] The United States had almost four times the rate of natural increase compared to Hungary at 10 per 1,000 people and the United Kingdom stood at 6.9 just above Czechoslovakia.^[29] While Czechoslovakia’s rate of natural increase may seem reasonable when compared to other nations such as the United Kingdom, it is important to keep in mind the economic system the East European countries operated under.

Generally, there were three types of policies that were used by themselves or in conjunction to promote fertility: “(1) moral propaganda strategies; (2) economic measures; and (3) legal-administrative policies.”^[30] Moral propaganda strategies were campaigns done by the media and the Communist Party. Economic measures included strategies such as longer maternity leave, improved child care, and financial allowances for larger families. The legal-administrative approach is viewed as more coercive as governments using this strategy would restrict abortion and/or contraceptives. Regulating the minimum age required for marriage is a less direct characteristic of this approach that would be used in conjunction with regulating abortion and contraception.^[31] In most countries, artificial birth control was not used widely by women as a form of fertility control with Hungary being an exception.^[32] Abortion was the most frequent birth control strategy whether legal or illegal and up until about the middle of the 1960s abortion was legalized for the vast majority of East European states.^[33]

Hungary pursued some legal-administrative strategies to stimulate birth control as well as positive economic incentives. A family allowance was put in place and raised multiple times for the births of second and third children.^[34] For years before restrictions on abortion, Hungary relied completely on these positive incentives to raise the birthrate. In 1973, about seven years after Romania instituted its full ban on abortion, Hungary decided to restrict it as well. However, the restrictions weren’t nearly as draconian as abortion on request was available for divorced, single, separated, or widowed women, and for married women over forty years old. These exceptions applied to those who had three living children had experienced three births, or had two living children and an “obstetrical event.”^[35] In addition tothese already existing exceptions any women who didn’t meet any of the criteria could still request a termination of pregnancy for a multitude of reasons which included social reasons and women were able to appeal negative rulings.^[36] Not only were abortion restrictions much milder than Romania’s, but the economic incentives were stronger as well. Hungary allowed mothers to stay home for up to 31 months on leave with a flat rate of pay.^[37] It is striking that even with the lowest fertility rate of the four countries examined in this paper that Hungary decided not to make abortion illegal, unlike Romania. Romania’s rate of natural increase was 2.5 times more than Hungary’s and its actions were far more aggressive.

Czechoslovakia had a larger emphasis on positive incentives to encourage fertility. Abortion was generally easy to obtain for women but required the consent of abortion committees which was available upon request.^[38] According to a newspaper from 1973, Czechoslovakia allowed women to take leave for as long as two years paid and with a guarantee that the mother’s job would still be available for her to return to.^[39] Brzozowska details the incentives given, “Having children almost guaranteed access to a rental apartment, entitled parents to substantial allowances and payments, and made women eligible for earlier retirement…Czechoslovakia spent 10% of its 1975 budget on population policy measures.”^[40] The regime’s efforts worked in their favor as fertility ceased its decline. With a rate of natural increase similar to Romania’s, 6.4 to 6.0 the differences in approach to pronatalist policies are made even more apparent.

Why did Romania take such a different path than Hungary which had a much lower rate of natural increase and even Czechoslovakia which had the closest rate of natural increase to it? This is because Ceausescu not only needed to increase the birthrate, but he also needed to make up for all the lost time and increase the birthrate exponentially every single year. A drastic increase was necessary to accomplish his rapid industrialization plans. Both an improved economy and a high population would help shield Romania from any foreign interference. It would protect against invasion from powers such as the Soviet Union which had invaded Czechoslovakia only two years after Ceausescu had taken power. Perhaps if Czechoslovakia had a larger population, it could have repelled the Soviet Union. This was an event that would stand out in his memory for his entire reign. This event had also built his cult of personality from the ground up and his promises and efforts to protect Romanian independence and sovereignty through his largely nationalistic propaganda made him believe that he could accomplish the monumental task of making Romania an East European powerhouse. Ceausescu would use the popular anti-Russian sentiment in Romania to bolster his cult and justification for his policies which he felt at the end of the day would be enough for his people to hold onto.^[41]

Ceausescu’s Coercive Campaign

In 1966, a series of pronatalist laws passed in quick succession. Abortions were made illegal through Decree 770 and would result in imprisonment for between one to three years if women were caught.^[42] This draconian prohibition of abortion would be continued in the decades to come until Decree 770 was overturned in 1989. In fact, the strict punishment for women was reinforced in 1986 when amnesties were given for prison sentences between 1-3 years except for those of “illegally procured abortion.”^[43] Women who obtained abortions were put in the same category as those who caused deaths, raped, took bribes, and committed violent assault. Once again women’s bodies were connected to their identities as mothers and to maintain their identity as good women, they must give birth or face the harsh consequences for refusing to do so. As Maria Bucur stated “women were, above all, procreators…this identity had to be assumed; it was ‘the first stage in political life to which women aspire.’”^[44] Birth was then described as “a fundamentally biopolitical act.”^[45] While there were exceptions to Decree 770, they were far more stringent than those in Czechoslovakia or Hungary where abortion was not illegal and could be attained through request. These included: the mother’s life being in danger, one parent having a deadly hereditary disease, the mother having a physical or psychological disability, the mother being 45 or older, the mother already having 4 children, and if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.^[46]

After Decree 770 passed, the divorce law was tightened. Before 1966, divorce could be obtained easily by paying a tax of 500 lei,but after Ceausescu’s tampering divorce could only be obtained in exceptional cases. ^[47] The cost of divorce court proceedings skyrocketed to between 3,000-6,000 lei and a waiting period introduced with the law could last a year and a half.^[48] With the vast restriction of divorce, the tightening could be considered a ban. The legal age of marriage was also lowered to 15 as well.^[49]

In 1967 taxes were increased from between ten to twenty percent for childless men and women who had reached their 25th birthday, regardless of their marital status.^[50] In 1986 this was increased.^[51] In 1985 “demographic command units” were put in place to ensure government regulations were observed. Their duties included performing monthly gynecological examinations and giving fertility treatment to women unable to conceive.^[52] They were also meant to discover any pregnancies and subsequent abortions.^[53] These “units” would take women from their workplaces or school in order to examine them, try to coerce nonpregnant women into having children, investigate reported miscarriages, and interrogate women who did not produce children quickly enough.^[54] One woman with the pseudonym F, who was interviewed by Jill Massino in 2003 described the coercion and control of women’s reproduction, “It [Decree 770 and attendant policies] was purely and simply a crime! A crime… it was one of the worst things that happened…. It was political rape… we were raped, obligated, at all times to do what the party wanted. We didn’t have… they didn’t give us the possibility to choose.”^[55] Once again, women’s identities were directly tied to their ability to procreate and in most cases the expectation that they would do so without complaint. Women who did not fill reproductive quotas without a strong reproductive reason were unlikely to be promoted and may have lost their jobs.^[56]

Of course, there were economic incentives as well, but they were not substantial when compared to the incentives offered by other East European countries discussed previously. Maternity leave was the shortest of any East European country at 16 weeks or 4 months when compared to Czechoslovakia’s up to 2 years of paid leave and Hungary’s 31 months with a flat rate of pay.^[57] In Romania, medical leaves were paid while a woman was pregnant, a one-time maternity grant of about $85 which was almost the average monthly income in the country, and there was a monthly child allowance which was increased by $3 over the years, but could not come close to alleviating the cost of raising a child.^[58] The monthly allowance would prove even more inadequate in the wake of the 1980s when prices for many necessary goods would skyrocket in Romania; energy had to be rationed, clothing for children was scarce, food prices surged to over 50 percent, and items necessary for children such as baby formula and milk were almost unattainable.^[59]  

In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the decision of whether to have a child was a matter of cost/benefit. In Romania, this decision was a situation that women were thrown into. This was due to the restriction of contraceptives and then circumstances where pregnant women were forced to try and receive an abortion illegally, through some tight loophole, or have a child they could rarely afford to take care of with the meager benefits being tossed their way by Ceausescu’s regime. This difference is made apparent when comparing Romania to a country with a lower fertility rate: Hungary. Ultimately Hungary and Czechoslovakia’s non-coercive strategies worked somewhat in the long term and avoided undue stress in this regard.

Almost all the policies passed in Romania were coercive and it is clear from these policies that “the needs of the nation superseded those of the individual,” the needs of women were especially disregarded.^[60] What were the needs of the nation? ? Pavel Campeanu, a Romanian sociologist suggested in an article that the banning of abortion and a series of increasingly aggressive policies were not a response to a demographic crisis due to low statistics since other East European countries had a lower fertility rate.^[61] Correlating the statistics to the largely economic approach Hungary took, it is easy to see why he would have this view. The other East European states weren’t preparing for a confrontation with the Soviet Union as Ceausescu was. He had been criticizing the Soviet Union ever since the invasion of Czechoslovakia which was an event he was desperately trying to avoid in his own country.

Consequences

After the rulings prohibiting abortion and divorce, a sharp increase in births occurred in Romania. “Crude birth rates increased from 14.3 in 1966 to 27.4 in 1967 and the total fertility rate increased from 1.9 to 3.7 children per woman in the same period.”^[62] A large number of births continued for about 3-4 years before the fertility rate stabilized for almost 20 years at a rate a bit higher than the average fertility rate in Hungary.^[63] The use of illegal abortions increased greatly after 1966. As McIntyre states, an unusually large number of spontaneous abortions numbered over 153,000, and a sharp rise in maternal mortality and mortality because of abortion makes apparent the increase in illegal abortions.^[64] The same woman, F, who was interviewed by Massino remarked further on Decree 770’s effect on women’s health “It was horrible because many women died.”^[65] By the late 1980s, the maternal mortality rate was 10 times higher than in any country in Europe.^[66] Complications and deaths from abortions became frequent and botched abortions caused a significant number of birth defects and handicaps which would contribute heavily to the number of mistreated children I in orphanages specifically for handicapped children.^[67] The increase in mortality rates and complications clearly shows once again the disregard the regime had for the individual needs and lives of its people and that the needs of the nation were the most vital even in the face of unimaginable suffering. A CIA report noted that the other East European regimes gave priority to civilian welfare in such contrast to Ceausescu’s lack of regard that it was noticeable.^[68]

Infant mortality rates rose as well after Ceausescu’s coercive policies were passed. Between 1966 and 1986 the infant mortality rate increased by 27% and the late fetal death rate increased by 22%, a large increase in low birth weights occurred as well.^[69] CristianPop-Eleches theorized that children born in a regime with a restrictive birth control policy were more likely to be unplanned, unwanted, and mistimed in contrast to a regime where a woman exercised control over her own fertility.^[70] What happened to all the unplanned, mistimed, and unwanted children in Romania and why did so many of them end up in government run orphanages?

Birthrate Decline/Child Abandonment

Two prominent inquiries are why the birthrate declined to begin with and why parents would cede their children to be raised in government run facilities. The answers are curiously intertwined. The onset of the 1980s seems to be the ramp-up period of both a declining birthrate and simultaneously an increase of children somehow ending up in government run orphanages. The cause of these events came back to once again, Nicolae Ceausescu.

As for the birthrate decline, there were a few causes that do not completely align with why parents abandoned their children. Clearly widespread abortion before the passing of Decree 770 is the reason why the birthrate fell, but what factors led women to choose to pursue abortions so regularly as opposed to having the child? In the 1950s and 1960s fertility declined sharply as the promised daycares for working women were far below needs and expectations, and because there were far too few of them. Working women found it difficult to combine the role of mother and employee which was exacerbated by urbanization when they moved out of their parent’s homes to work in the city.^[71] Even with the maternity leave extended to 16 weeks in the mid-1960s Romanian maternity leave was still the shortest of all the East European countries. The family as a cohesive unit was destroyed in urbanization, and, “By the 1980s, most young couples moved to cities while their parents remained in the countryside, so they could no longer depend on their extended families to help with childcare. Childcare services were unavailable, particularly for those from low-income families.”^[72] Villages and country life was destroyed and industrialization and urbanization removed the traditional ways of raising children with grandparents around to help, but with the newer established system of communism, young people had no institutions like the church to provide support.^[73]

However, most issues that contributed to the decline in births and the abandonment of children were shared between the two circumstances Living standards and quality of life greatly declined in the 1980s due to an economic slowdown. Ceausescu caused the decline when at the beginning of the 1980s when faced with a debt of 10.2 billion he decided to pay off all foreign debt by 1990 which he had racked up after he turned to the West to finance his “autarkic economic policies.”^[74] He tried to accomplish this by cutting imports and greatly increasing exports, even though it impoverished his people.^[75] He took this route because he was convinced that the debt was a threat Romania’s economic and political autonomy.^[76] The CIA agreed that Romania being dependent on foreign debtors left the country “more vulnerable to Soviet enticements,” which would be a large concern to both Ceausescu and the United States.^[77] This is why Ceausescu proceeded to export most of Romania’s agricultural produce which led to persistent food shortages.^[78] The CIA blamed Ceausescu’s personal mismanagement for the economy faltering due to his policies of rapid industrial development and his tight control over the centralized, rigid economic structure which means that all decisions correlated directly to his motivations for protecting Romanian independence. They reported the growth of national income being an average of 2.3 per annum in 1982 which was the lowest rate since the 1950s.^[79] Ultimately Ceausescu’s trade strategy failed and led to the decline of agricultural output, energy shortages, and poverty.

The lack of investment, Ceausescu’s halting of imports and increasing of exports, and declining agricultural productivity led to persistent food shortages. Ceausescu deliberately neglected investments in agriculture in favor of industrialization which led to a mass decline in agricultural exports resulting in a $231 million deficit by 1980 and imports of agricultural products fell by more than 2/3rds between 1980 and 1984 which would become a grave strategy since the average grain production from 1981-1985 was less than from 1976-1980 by 1.1 million metric tons.^[80]

Reacting to these food shortages in late 1981 into early 1982, the regime instituted formal rationing on sugar, flour, and cooking oil.^[81] “Livestock products-especially meat and milk- have become so scarce that they are not even formally rationed…Food prices at state retail stores have surged by over 50 percent since 1980, with only bread prices remaining relatively stable”^[82] Said a CIA report from 1986 and proceeded to state, “In some areas, baby formula is not available and young children can obtain milk on with a doctor’s prescription.”^[83] It is no surprise that in such conditions families and mothers would feel more compelled to give their children to the government in hopes that the government had resources to care for them. Another CIA report stated that bread became scarce in some parts of the country as well.^[84] In June 1985, Romania’s parliament adopted a plan manufactured by Ceausescu referred to as a “scientific diet” which recommended that already deprived Romanians eat fewer calories for health reasons.^[85]

The second major issue caused by Ceausescu’s failed debt repayment and trade strategy was energy shortages. Rapid industrialization depleted the energy stores and produced widespread shortages. A CIA report speculating about East Europe’s upcoming issues with maintaining energy stores through the 1985 winter predicted that Romania would continue to export a large portion of its oil even with the existing energy shortages and limited imports.^[86] The sentiment that the end justified the means was on full display in Romania during the 1980s.

Another ration was put in place to conserve energy with mandated cuts of up to 75% in household energy consumption between 1983-1985, gas and electricity in neighborhoods could be shut off for several days during extremely cold weather from 1984-to 1985, and in 1985 this left residents without heat during the coldest winter they had experienced in 17 years.^[87] A state of emergency was declared by Ceausescu and the militia inspected houses, fined violators, and at times plastered over electrical outlets.^[88] Another woman interviewed by Jill Massino who went under the pseudonym F spoke about her experiences living during this time with a baby. She was upset because there weren’t enough materials available to take care of him. She said“It was during the winter, there wasn’t any heat, there wasn’t any electricity, everything was rationed, there was no clothing for children…In order to give him a bath I had to heat the water on the stove in a pot. I had a ten liter pot and the flame was so small that it took two hours for the pot of ten liters to heat up.”^[89]

A CIA report compared Ceausescu’s priorities to other East European countries which gave greater priority to protecting consumer welfare out of fear of popular discontent while Ceausescu had no such concerns.^[90] Once again, why did Ceausescu have no concerns? It would be incredibly narcissistic to take such a drastic economic policy decision with no safeguards in place, but thankfully Ceausescu did have safeguards. Ceausescu had fashioned his cult to have pre-built justifications for his actions which he felt allowed him to do whatever he pleased. He used both the nationalistic stance and his own personal reputation to shoulder any discontent his people may have felt and justify the demands of his industrialization plans.^[91] His argument that the growth of the national economy was “was essential for strengthening the state’s capacity to act as an independent actor on the international scene” and to allow the leadership to make independent decisions based on the interests of Romania was justification.^[92] Ceausescu also leveraged his father-like figure that propaganda transformed him into. This father-like figure’s main concern was to ensure the welfare of the country and its people, allowing him to justify any decision as just.^[93] The worse the quality of life became in Romania the harder he pushed the party propaganda to solidify his control over the country or as Dikötter said, “The great the misery, the louder the propaganda.”^[94] Ceausescu’s success for yet another occasion hinged on his cult of personality would allow him to avoid any possible unrest from his people and he believed he had. While his people would applaud and praise him when he appeared in public, as soon as he was gone the criticism and insults began.^[95] “He became a prisoner of his own cult of personality. He did not recognize the illegitimacy of his regime”^[96] His unwavering belief in his own cult is what would propel the country into revolution and Ceausescu to his own execution.

The rapid decline in quality of life in Romania had disastrous consequences. Prices for energy and food increased, rents doubled, and the price of clothing rose steeply.^[97] There was a sharp rise in mortality rates due to poor nutrition, inadequate heat, and the unavailability of medication, and infant mortality which was already higher than everywhere else in Europe increased by 35%, and the crude death rate for the entire population since 1980 increased far more rapidly than any other East European country as well.^[98] Many children were given to institutions by parents who may have wanted these children, but could not afford to take care of them and left them at orphanages or at dystrophic or malnutrition hospitals.^[99] The Human Rights Watch believed that the food shortages and malnutrition specifically in children due to Ceausescu’s mismanagement led to the establishment of the dystrophic hospitals which is why many parents left their children at them.^[100] However, these hospitals would prove unable to deal with malnutrition and would be instrumental in the eventual spread of AIDS.^[101]

The Orphanages

All children would live in leaganes ffrom their birth to the age of three before being transferred to another institution. The leagan was managed by the Ministry of Health.^[102] Once a child turned three, they would be examined by a pediatrician, psychiatrist and/or a psychologist and based on the results of the examination would be separated into two groups at a “switching center” and according to Romania’s Abandoned Children, there was no systematic approach to what child went to which institution.^[103] These children would go on to live in orphanages that housed children three to six years old, and then to orphanages that housed them from six to eighteen years old.^[104] Unfortunately, healthy children were put in homes for the handicapped and classified as disabled or uncurable by physicians, a common problem occurring due to a lack of knowledge and ability.^[105] These otherwise healthy children weren’t given the opportunity to develop intellectually or physically to their full capacity.^[106]

In 1970 two types of institutions were established for children: those for typically developing children and those for handicapped children.^[107] These are updated terms referring to these children, since at that time in Romania these children would be separated by whether the regime decided if they were “normal” versus “abnormal,” and “productive” versus “unproductive.” The latter of each would be seen as useless and while none of the orphanages were up to an acceptable standard of living, the children seen as unimportant would be left to rot in horrific conditions. These institutions were also managed by separate ministries with the typically developing children in the casi de copii being managed by the Ministry of Education and the handicapped children in the camine spital or institutul neuropshichiatric strangely being managed by the Ministry of Labor.^[108] The arrangement is an odd one due to the fact that these children were determined to be “unproductive,” a term of importance that will be explored further.^[109] There was another institution for handicapped children who were determined to be “curable” versus the “uncurable” who were housed in the camine spital and institutul neuropshichiatric, and these “curable” children lived in a gradinißa.^[110] The most egregious, neglectful, and abusive treatment occurred in the camine spital and institutul neuropshichiatric. They were seen as unimportant to Ceausescu’s plan, so little to no provisions for adequate supplies or care were given to them or considered a high priority.

Quality of Life

Institutions for Children Under 3 Years of Age

Romania’s Abandoned Children investigated the leagans that cared for children from birth to three years old in 2000. They found that caregiver-to-child ratios varied by location, but that they were always unfavorable with the children outnumbering the caregivers, sometimes 12-15 to one caregiver, but sometimes even more. Caregivers also received no formal training and had a detached manner when interacting with the children, even 10 years after the fall of Ceausescu and communism with him. Often infants would spend most of the day lying in cribs with little stimulation or attention, only receiving extra holding or interaction if they were one of the caregiver’s “favorite.” The researchers reported on the social interactions they had with the infants “Although we could make eye contact with them, it took considerable effort to get them to smile at us—with several we never succeeded.” The researchers remarked that the infants were at the “most purely social time in development,” but were extremely socially impaired leading to the conclusion that the infants had little to no opportunity for face-to-face interaction with a caregiver.^[111]

Institutions for Typically Developing Children

From the leagans, children found to be typically developing were sent to live in the casi di copii or orphanages for typically developing children over the age of three. These institutions held about 60% of all the children who lived in government facilities and the children there all attended public schools as well.^[112]

Institutions for Handicapped Children

The treatment of children in the orphanages for the handicapped and disabled was much more complicated and brutal. Ceausescu’s successor, President Ion Iliescu, compared the orphanages to concentration camps.^[113] It is easy to understand why when explored further. Rooms could house up to 15 children, there were bars on the windows, and several buildings children had to travel long distances to get to in the winter and harsh weather.^[114] They did not attend school, instead being cuffed or tied to their beds and bottle-fed until they were old enough to be thrown out of the institution.^[115] The children who lived in the institutul neuropshichiatric, and camine spital in particular suffered from gross neglect and malnutrition which caused the mortality rates to be high. In a Washington Post article “A Ceausescu Legacy: Warehouses for Children” a director of a medical team from France stationed in Bucharest to provide humanitarian aid said of the children, “They die of hunger, of very dirty environment, of nobody touching them and of never getting out of their beds.”^[116]

Children in these institutions were fed “bread, fatty sausage, tripe gruel, and wormy apples”^[117] Educational services, rehabilitation programs, or physical therapy was not available.^[118] Human Rights Watch reported that even where physical therapy equipment existed and a physical therapist was available no children received any therapeutic treatment.^[119] As a result, the children who desperately needed medical care, more help with education, and physical therapy because of their disabilities received none at all. A situation that would have been deemed unacceptable treatment of typically developing children was the norm for children deemed “uncurable” by the regime. The cleanliness of the institutions was largely lacking or ignored.^[120] Romania’s Abandoned Children testified to have witnessed “children who squatted over plastic pots to defecate, and after completing their task, they simply pulled up their pajama pants without wiping or washing. The children did not look for assistance from caregivers, nor was any offered”^[121] Not only had the children not been taught how to take care of themselves, but they had also been neglected and ignored to the point where they knew not to ask for help from caregivers because they knew they would not receive any.

The orphanage in Videle that the Washington Post investigated was called the Home for the Deficient and Unsalvageable.^[122] Here the children who had mild epilepsy or polio-splayed legs were put with children who suffered from severe autism and the blind or deaf sat in rooms all day with children who could not control their bodily functions.^[123] Any child put in these institutions was lumped together regardless of their conditions or differences which made taking care of them much more difficult. Even healthy children were sent to the orphanages for handicapped children when there was no space for them in the casi de copii.^[124] They may have just ended up in the wrong type of orphanage because their parents dropped them off at the wrong one or because the psychiatrist who determined where each child went made an error. Either way, because of these failings, these children didn’t have a chance to develop intellectually and physically to their true capacity. An example of this is included in the Washington Post article, about a child named Vasilica Bogoju who was 14 at the time of publishing. She was described as almost normal by staff who had hoped she would be allowed to go to a special school to learn basket-making, but she was turned down because of, “Her legs,”^[125] Her legs were twisted, so she walked on her knees, but that was her only handicap and she was placed with children whose conditions were completely different from hers and then prohibited from learning a trade to benefit her in the future.

The quality of life in these institutions was horrific for those deemed to be not useful to the regime’s cause. Doctors from other countries said, “Romania’s system — with its combination of neglect, bureaucracy, and haphazard medical care — is in a class by itself. Even in the poorest countries in Africa, they say, mentally and physically disabled children are not left alone in bare rooms for hours every day, deprived of the sound of human language or physical contact.”^[126]  Then what makes Romania different from all the poorest countries in Africa and the other communist East European states? Nicolae Ceausescu of course. The combination of an obsession with Romanian independence from the Soviet Union and other powers, a desire for total control, and a cult of personality resulted in horrific human rights abuses, especially towards those who would not advance the needs and mission of the nation. If the children did not advance toward Ceausescu’s goals they were simply discarded because the needs of the nation superseded those of any individual. The study done by Romania’s Abandoned Children, ultimately found that children experienced a substantially lower quality of care by institutional caregivers than children who were raised by their parents.^[127]

Why Were the Children Neglected?

The staff was extremely underprepared to take care of the children in the institutul neuropshichiatric, and canine spital. Why were they so underprepared? Some centers were located in remote villages which were unable to provide the necessary medical and psychological care the children needed.^[128] To make matters worse, in the mid-1970s nursing schools were closed and trained medical staff became even more in short supply, so typically the women in villages close to the institutions staffed them and were poorly paid with little to no education, and no special training to care for mentally or physically handicapped children.^[129] The orphanages were also poorly funded, with 14 lei per child being provided by the government until the mid-1990s.^[130]

Defectology

Romanian children were dealt with using the Soviet Union’s theory of Defectology. Defectology defined disabilities as a disease that made them intrinsically abnormal regardless of environmental factors that could affect them, so if a child was born with a disability there was no reason to provide education, therapy, or interventions.^[131] Defectology and the categorization of children with disabilities were based on that individual’s potential productivity.^[132] Defectology in practice allowed the regime to separate the unproductive from the productive children who deserved more resources and protected the regime from wasting their money in their view. Hence the children in the camin spital and institutul neurophichiatric who were considered incurable were treated with the most neglect and abuse in contrast to the children at the gradinißa, which was also a special education facility for those who were considered curable. A reminder that the orphanage the Washington Post investigators visited was named the Home for the Deficient and Unsalvageable.^[133] Western journalists blamed the treatment of children deemed irrecuperable on “a totalitarian system that made a cult of physical labor and encouraged the idea that anyone unable to labor for the state was not quite human”^[134] To an outside observer it certainly seems that way.

The Human Rights Watch asserted that there was a “series of intentional government policy choices that created this nightmare.”^[135] They are certainly correct. From what has been outlined above it is clear to any outside observer that a clear progression of policies and decisions led to the suffering of over 100,000 children. The man who made all of those decisions was Nicolae Ceausescu. In order to cement his control over his country and prevent outside interference in his decisions, he needed to build the power of the nation. He attempted to do so through growing the population which was directly correlated in the minds of the East European regimes to the power of their nation and through building the population he would grow the economy which is a clear motivation of his. This is shown through the treatment of handicapped and disabled children through the theory of Defectology which justified the discarding of people not deemed to be “productive.”

The AIDS Epidemic

In 1990 Human Rights Watch reported that 683 children between the ages of 1 and 4 had contracted AIDS and another 1,000 were HIV positive.^[136] In 1990, the Washington Post article reported that 65% of the 458 cases of AIDS in infants were abandoned children.^[137] More than half the sick children from Europe lived in Romania.^[138] The medical facilities and practices were medieval in practice with disastrous effects. One issue is the way blood was collected. Blood was normally donated for favors such as having paper processed, a free meal, one to two days off from work, renewals of driver’s licenses, student visa renewals, or getting a job.^[139] Ordinary people had to comply with requests which meant that people who were HIV positive donated blood as well.^[140]

The second issue had to do with the dystrophic wards. Children and especially infants were left in these wards by their parents in the wake of mass food shortages caused by Ceausescu’s plan in the 1980s. Parents would leave their malnourished children in the dystrophic hospitals and by 1989, the wards held 2,400 patients. Usually, in a low-tech country such as Romania there would be few infusions, thus largely avoiding an epidemic, but instead of oral antibiotics, infusions and injections were used regularly at the dystrophic hospitals with some children receiving up to 120 injections over a 4-week period at the hospital and leagane. A common treatment was microtranfusions where a small amount of blood would be taken from a seemingly healthy baby and injected into an unhealthy baby. In addition to this, disposable needles were unavailable and the autoclaves available were old which led to nurses not boiling the needles used. Consequently, many children were infected with HIV or Hepatitis B because of these institutions.^[141]

There were multiple causes of the lack of knowledge that led to the massive spread of AIDS and HIV. There was a lack of freedom of association that kept medical professionals isolated from their foreign colleges and a restriction of information that made any foreign medical texts almost impossible to obtain. There was a refusal to acknowledge that HIV or AIDS existed in Romania, partly due to the assertion that homosexuality did not exist within the nation’s borders which resulted in a refusal to screen any donated blood for diseases. Doctors were also prohibited from entering a diagnosis of AIDS or HIV on medical certificates, instead noting an opportunistic infection or pneumonia. The clear attempt to restrict the flow of information between doctors and the refusal to take preventative measures implicates the regime and Ceausescu in his attempts to hide the epidemic as exacerbating the spread of the disease.^[142]

After the Collapse of Ceausescu: The New Government’s Response

After Ceausescu’s execution the discovery of the horrific system he had created led to three main issues for the new government to contend with: a large number of institutionalized children, numbering about or over 100,000 to 170,000, the continuing high rates of child abandonment, and the long-term issue of developing a new system to protecting abandoned children.^[143] All of these issues were exacerbated with child abandonment increasing due to the poverty and unemployment that resulted from the collapse of the Communist regime.^[144] The changes were slow going and through the next decade, the system for institutionalized children remained largely unchanged.

In 1990, pronatalism was abolished and abortion was made legal again for the first time in over two decades.^[145] Nursing schools were also reestablished, so specialized training would be available once again.^[146] The government increased the funding designated for each child on a daily basis from 14 to 28 lei.^[147] Supplying the basic supplies needed to support human life such as food, medical care, and social services was the government’s first response to the crisis.^[148] Additionally, there was an outpouring of aid from Western countries and NGOs.^[149] Romania sought to have many of the institutionalized children adopted, but it was difficult to accomplish internally. It was not traditional or common in Romania for families to adopt children they were not related to, but in addition to this, children and infants living in institutions were often seen as defective which caused them to be placed in such institutions initially.^[150] There was no system of foster care in Romania and although it was not illegal families rarely took in an institutionalized child for reasons specified previously and because of the long and cumbersome process to do so.^[151] With these two options largely unavailable and over a hundred thousand children to find a place for the new government needed to develop a solution quickly to prevent any more international fallout. Consequently, on July 31, 1990, the government passed a decree legalizing and decentralizing international adoptions which made adoptions the responsibility of local courts.^[152] As there were no specific legal procedures to follow children were adopted in many fashions.^[153]

Thus, international adoptions rose dramatically from 30 adoptions per year in 1989 to almost 5,000 per year after it was made legal by the government. Most families who came to adopt children met with the individual families privately and adopted children from their biological parents via the black market. Stories about “baby brokers” spread, where families from the United States would go to Romania and visit institutions where they were shown infants to adopt and exchange for hard currency after which the adoptive families would return to the United States with their newly adopted children and little understanding of what the child had experienced in the institution. The high number of international adoptions led to international condemnation.^[154]

Even with international adoptions occurring, the rate of institutionalization for infants in Romania did not decrease due to Law No. 3/1970 being still in effect. This law required that the government place abandoned children in institutions and in 1994 it remained the primary solution for children with struggling families who continued to struggle in the mid-1990s since poverty was still rampant and the economic conditions in the country remained dire. One solution came in Law No. 108/1998 which allowed biological parents to give a child up for adoption at birth but have thirty days to change their mind. Another attempt was made to transfer funds from adoption agencies to develop foster care and family support allowances, but even with the passage of laws to regulate international adoption the “baby trade” continued on the black market through 2000. Romania eventually outlawed international adoptions in 2005 for fear of being denied admission into the European Union and due to the international condemnation that came with the controversial institution.^[155]

Eventually, the government did succeed in closing many of the larger orphanages for children. In 1999, 31,500 children lived in foster care centers, a decrease from 1997, but coincided with an increase of children in families who received assistance from the government.^[156] From 2000 to 2007 the main goals of the government were to close large centers with about 100 children, then the medium centers with about 60 children, and keep the family type houses with up to 20 children.^[157]

Abandoned Children After the Revolution in 1989

An unintended side effect of the government’s closure of the orphanages was the increase of homeless children living on the streets. The number of children on the street increased with the closure of numerous orphanages, showing a clear correlation between two circumstances if not causation.^[158] It is difficult to estimate how many children live on the streets due to their nomadic lifestyle. Although in 1997 an estimate was made of about 400-450 children who lived on the street consistently with the number increasing during summer to 1,000-1,500 in Romania’s capital, Bucharest, and 2,500 in the entire country.^[159]

It is unknown how many children were reunited with their biological families, but the obstacles to do so were mounted against them. It would be extremely difficult for biological parents to find their children if they had not used the loophole to keep some legal rights of their child by visiting at least once every six months.^[160] If the child had been abandoned at birth, at age 3 they would go through the previously mentioned “switching center” that would decide which orphanage they would go to.^[161] Even if parents did know which center their child was being held at, said child could be transferred at any time to another center which would result in them being lost in the country as records were not being organized.^[162] But that is to assume that the parents were even doing the searching. A child searching for their parents would encounter even more difficulties than the ones outlined previously. Some Romanians immigrated to other countries, perhaps still in Europe, but the United States noted the increase of immigration of Romanians to the U.S. in a hearing held in 1980.^[163] It would be fair to infer that the demand for entry into the United States and other countries only increased during the decade which would be considered Romania’s most difficult under Ceausescu.

Concluding Thoughts

Ceausescu’s sultanic reign undoubtedly had an unfathomable impact on the lives of his people, the current generation, and most likely their posterity. Even seemingly unconnected circumstances such as the discovery and existence of over 100,000 abandoned children after his demise tied back to his decision making in some tangible fashion making clear just how much power he wielded over Romanians for over two decades. This essay exists as justification of the importance of demographic research as the topic spans all facets of a nation and disciplines: economics, law, resources, culture, tradition, and nationality.

Ceausescu’s obsession with maintaining his own power and control of Romania led him to create a cult of personality based on these nationalistic foundations that he alone would protect Romanian autonomy and independence from any and all foreign powers. The cult emphasized the threat of the Soviet Union in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The need to protect himself from outside interference is why he chose such draconian policy decisions when other East European countries in a similar situation did not. Through his cult, with the justification of protecting Romania through promoting nationalism, his propagandized reputation as a father-like figure securing his people’s welfare, and his reputation as a hero and the warden of national independence he believed that he could and had in fact convinced his people to go along with any decision he made. This unwise belief is what led to the violence of the revolution when compared to the other East European revolutions where Romania was also an outlier. Through Ceausescu’s attempts to solidify his position as permanent ruler of Romania through elite rotation, bureaucratic tinkering, harsh censorship, nepotism, and his cult of personality that made him the face of Romanian Communism he made himself the target of all discontent the people, the party, the military, and the state had. Since he had surrounded himself with people who could never criticize him, he believed in his own propaganda, left no avenue to dispel frustrations, and removed all political alternatives except violence and revolution. Violence and revolution is what he would receive in return for his folly.

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[1] Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: Collapse and Rebirth in Eastern Europe 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 8.

[2] Ibid., 68.

[3] Maria Bucur, “In Praise of Wellborn Mothers: On the Development of Eugenicist Gender Roles in Interwar Romania,” East European Politics and Societies 9, no. 1 (1994): 128-129, https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325495009001007.

[4] Zuzanna Brzozowska, “Female Education and Fertility under State Socialism in Central and Eastern Europe,” Population (English Edition, 2002-) 70, no. 4 (2015): 695, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44135457.

[5] Stephen Roper, “History of Romania: 1965-1989,” in Romania: The Unfinished Revolution, (London: Routledge, 2000), 45.

[6] Ibid., 46.

[7] Ibid., 47-48.

[8] Ibid., 51.

[9] Dikötter, “Ceausescu,” in How to Be a Dictator: The Cult of Personality in the Twentieth Century, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), 177.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Dikötter, “Ceausescu,”169.

[12] Manuela Marin, “‘We Thank You, Our Beloved Leader!’: The Origins and Evolution of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Cult of Personality,” in Ruler Personality Cults from Empires to Nation-States and Beyond, (Routledge, 2020), 218.

[13] Dikötter, “Ceausescu,”169.

[14] Dikötter, “Ceausescu,”169, 173.

[15] Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 8.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] “Situation Report: Romania, 21 September 1966”, 21 September 1966. [Electronic record] HU OSA 300-8-47-179-72; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest, 4.

[19] “Situation Report: Romania, 3 February 1986”, 3 February 1986. [Electronic record] HU OSA 300-8-47-210-2; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest, 19.

[20] “Situation Report: Romania, 20 March 1986”, 20 March 1986. [Electronic record] HU OSA 300-8-47-210-4; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest, 32.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Bucur, “In Praise of Wellborn Mothers,” 136.

[24] Brzozowska, “Female Education and Fertility,” 695.

[25] Central Intelligence Agency, “Romania: Difficult Adjustment to the Financial Crisis,” Central Intelligence Agency, 3.

[26] Dikötter, “Ceausescu,”179.

[27] Robert J. McIntyre, “Pronatalist Programmes in Eastern Europe,” Soviet Studies 27, no. 3 (1975): 366-367, http://www.jstor.org/stable/150442.

[28] United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, (New York: United Nations, 1965). 126.

[29] Ibid., 124-126.

[30] Jerome S. Legge and John R. Alford, “Can Government Regulate Fertility? An Assessment of Pronatalist Policy in Eastern Europe,” The Western Political Quarterly 39, no. 4 (1986): 712, https://doi.org/10.2307/448273.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Brzozowska, “Female Education and Fertility,” 694.

[33] Legge and Alford, “Can Government Regulate Fertility,” 710.

[34] McIntyre, “Pronatalist Programmes in Eastern Europe,” 371.

[35] Legge and Alford, “Can Government Regulate Fertility,” 715.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Brzozowska, “Female Education and Fertility,” 696.

[38] Brzozowska, “Female Education and Fertility,” 695-696.

[39] Eric Bourne, “Declining Birthrates Worry Eastern Europe: From Dogma to Logic Financial Aid Offered,” The Christian Science Monitor (1908-). November 21, 1973, 13.

[40] Brzozowska, “Female Education and Fertility,” 696.

[41] Roper, “History of Romania: 1965-1989,” 53.

[42] “Situation Report: Romania, 7 October 1966”, 7 October 1966. [Electronic record] HU OSA 300-8-47-179-77; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest, 5. http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:1ec57eeb-9bef-4606-88ef-573329e9395e

[43] “State Council Decree on Amnesties, Pardons Issued,” Bucharest Scinteia (June 3, 1986), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS Daily Report, East Europe. FBIS-EEU-86-113, June 3, 1986, page H3, heading: Romania. NewsBank, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports.

[44] Bucur, “In Praise of Wellborn Mothers,” 128.

[45] Ibid., 129.

[46] “Situation Report: Romania, 7 October 1966″, 5.

[47] “Situation Report: Romania, 12 October 1966″, 12 October 1966. [Electronic record] HU OSA 300-8-47-179-78; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest, 3-4. http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:832f01e2-5b60-44f3-a1bc-433c854a2d3b

[48] Ibid., 4.

[49] “Attempts To Increase Birth Rate Examined.,” Vienna Television Service (January 2, 1988), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS Daily Report, East Europe. FBIS-EEU-88-001, January 2, 1988, page 56, heading: Romania. NewsBank, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports.

[50] “Situation Report: Romania, 11 January 1967”, 11 January 1967. [Electronic record] HU OSA 300-8-47-180-2; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. 4. http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:6bdfae35-0b7f-4fe1-a993-804f1f2aad39

[51] “Situation Report: Romania, 3 February 1986”, 3 February 1986. [Electronic record] HU OSA 300-8-47-210-2; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. 2. http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:b702fc37-1eab-4709-97d1-272edf7073c6

[52] Ibid., 19.

[53] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” Human Rights Watch, December 1, 1990, 2. https://www.hrw.org/report/1990/12/01/romanias-orphans-legacy-repression.

[54] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 46.

[55] Jill Massino, “Women’s Reflections on Motherhood and Reproduction under Socialism,” Making the History of 1989, Item #560, https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/560 (accessed September 24 2021, 11:55 am).

[56] Legge and Alford, “Can Government Regulate Fertility,” 725.

[57] Brzozowska, “Female Education and Fertility,” 697.

[58] Cristian Pop-Eleches. “The Supply of Birth Control Methods, Education, and Fertility: Evidence from Romania,” The Journal of Human Resources 45, no. 4 (2010): 975. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25764796.

[59] Central Intelligence Agency, “Romania: Difficult Adjustment to the Financial Crisis,” 18-19. Jill Massino, “Women’s Reflections on Motherhood and Reproduction under Socialism,”

[60] Bucur, “In Praise of Wellborn Mothers,” 137.

[61] Pavel Campeanu, “Birth and Death in Romania, October 1986,” Making the History of 1989,” 1989. 5, https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/694.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] McIntyre, “Pronatalist Programmes in Eastern Europe,” 377.

[65] Massino, “Women’s Reflections on Motherhood and Reproduction under Socialism,”

[66] Pop-Eleches. “The Supply of Birth Control Methods, Education, and Fertility,” 975.

[67] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 3.

[68] Central Intelligence Agency, “Romania: Difficult Adjustment to the Financial Crisis,” iii.

[69] Cristian Pop‐Eleches, “The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic Outcomes of Children: Evidence from Romania,” Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 4 (2006): 767, https://doi.org/10.1086/506336.

[70] Ibid., 746.

[71] Brzozowska, “Female Education and Fertility,” 692.

[72] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 47.

[73] Cristina-Maria Povian and Cristian Dumitrescu, “Educational System for Children in Need from Romania- in the Communist Period and Nowadays,” Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences, 7th World Conference on Educational Sciences, 197 (July 25, 2015): 46, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.07.167.

[74] Roper, “History of Romania: 1965-1989,” 52.

[75] Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 69.

[76] Roper, “History of Romania: 1965-1989,” 55.

[77] Central Intelligence Agency, “Romania: Difficult Adjustment to the Financial Crisis,” iii.

[78] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 3.

[79] Central Intelligence Agency, “Unrest in Romania: Causes and Implications,” Central Intelligence Agency, March 1, 1982, 3-6.

[80] Central Intelligence Agency, “Romania: Difficult Adjustment to the Financial Crisis,” 2, 5, and 18.

[81] Ibid., 18.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid., 19.

[84] Central Intelligence Agency, “Romanian: The Outlook for Ceausescu,” Central Intelligence Agency, December 22, 1983, 8.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Central Intelligence Agency, “Eastern Europe’s Winter Energy Worries,” Central Intelligence Agency, November 15, 1985, 7.

[87] Central Intelligence Agency, “Romania: Difficult Adjustment to the Financial Crisis,” 18. Central Intelligence Agency, “Eastern Europe’s Winter Energy Worries,” 3.

[88] Central Intelligence Agency, “Romania: Difficult Adjustment to the Financial Crisis,” 13, 18.

[89] Massino, “Women’s Reflections on Motherhood and Reproduction under Socialism,”

[90] Central Intelligence Agency, “Romania: Difficult Adjustment to the Financial Crisis,” iii.

[91] Roper, “History of Romania: 1965-1989,” 50-51.

[92] Marin, “‘We Thank You, Our Beloved Leader!’,” 231.

[93] Ibid., 225.

[94] Dikötter, “Ceausescu,”179.

[95] Ibid., 182.

[96] Roper, “History of Romania: 1965-1989,” 57.

[97] Central Intelligence Agency, “Romania: Difficult Adjustment to the Financial Crisis,” 18.

[98] Ibid., 19.

[99] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 3.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid., 4.

[102] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 4.

[103] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 47-48.

[104] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 4.

[105] Tobis, Moving from Residential Institutions to Community-Based Social Services, 9.

[106] Povian and Dumitrescu, “Educational System for Children in Need from Romania,” 461.

[107] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 47.

[108] Ibid., 49.

[109] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 4.

[110] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 48-49.

[111] All statements and quotations from Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 50-51.

[112] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 48.

[113] “Iliescu’s Regime Blamed for Nation’s Collapse,” Bucharest Dreptaea (October 25, 1990), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS Daily Report, East Europe. FBIS-EEU-90-211, October 30, 1990, page 56, heading: Romania. NewsBank, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports.

[114] Povian and Dumitrescu, “Educational System for Children in Need from Romania,” 462.

[115] Ibid., 461.

[116] Battiata, “A Ceausescu Legacy: Warehouses for Children,” Washington Post, June 7, 1990, accessed November 3, 2021.

[117] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 52.

[118] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 5.

[119] Ibid., 6.

[120] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 52.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Battiata, “A Ceausescu Legacy: Warehouses for Children,”

[123] Ibid.

[124] Povian and Dumitrescu, “Educational System for Children in Need from Romania,” 461.

[125] Battiata, “A Ceausescu Legacy: Warehouses for Children,”

[126] Ibid.

[127] Charles A. Nelson, Nathan A. Fox, and Charles H. Zeanah, “Study Design and Launch,” in Romania’s Abandoned Children, 35. Harvard University Press, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpq4g.5

[128] Povian and Dumitrescu, “Educational System for Children in Need from Romania,” 461.

[129] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 5.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 49.

[132] Tobis, Moving from Residential Institutions to Community-Based Social Services, 9.

[133] Battiata, “A Ceausescu Legacy: Warehouses for Children,”

[134] Ibid.

[135] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 6.

[136] Ibid., 6.

[137] Battiata, “A Ceausescu Legacy: Warehouses for Children,”

[138] Povian and Dumitrescu, “Educational System for Children in Need from Romania,” 462.

[139] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 7.

[140] Ibid.

[141] All statements from Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 7-8.

[142] All statements from Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 11.

[143] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 55.

[144] Ibid.

[145] Human Rights Watch, “Romania’s Orphans: A Legacy of Repression,” 12.

[146] Ibid.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 56.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Ibid., 57.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid., 58.

[153] Ibid.

[154] All statements from Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 58.

[155] All statements from Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “The History of Child Institutionalization in Romania,” 58-60, 62, and 64-65.

[156] Povian and Dumitrescu, “Educational System for Children in Need from Romania,” 463.

[157] Ibid., 464.

[158] Ibid.

[159] Ibid., 463.

[160] Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, “Study Design and Launch,” 25.

[161] Battiata, “A Ceausescu Legacy: Warehouses for Children,”

[162] Povian and Dumitrescu, “Educational System for Children in Need from Romania,” 461.

[163] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., September 16, 1980, 21.

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